



The lottery paradox shows that the following three individually highly plausi-
ble theses are jointly incompatible: (i) highly probable propositions are justi-
fiably believable, (ii) justified believability is closed under conjunction intro-
duction, (iii) known contradictions are not justifiably believable. This paper
argues that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox must reject (i) as ver-
sions of the paradox can be generated without appeal to either (ii) or (iii) and
proposes a new solution to the paradox in terms of a novel account of justified
believability.
1. Consider the following three theses:
Sufficiency Thesis (ST). If the probability of p on one’s evidence is very high, then p is
justifiably believable for one.
Conjunction Closure (CC). If p is justifiably believable for one and q is justifiably believ-
able for one, then their conjunction, p and q, is justifiably believable for one.
No Contradictions (NC). No proposition one knows to be a contradiction is justifiably
believable for one.
While individually plausible, it turns out that ST, CC and NC are jointly in-
consistent. To see this, notice that no matter how high we set the standards for
satisfaction of the predicate ‘very likely’, there will be some fair lottery with ex-
actly one winner such that it is very likely on my evidence that each ticket will lose.
So suppose that a ticket will very likely lose if the chance that it will lose is at least
(n−1)/n and let l be a fair lottery I know to have n tickets and exactly one winner.
By ST, for each ticket i ∈ l, it is justifiably believable for me that i will lose. By CC,
it is justifiably believable for me that all tickets in l will lose. Since I also know that
l has exactly one winner, by a further application of CC, it is justifiably believable
for me that all tickets in l will lose and that exactly one ticket in l will win. How-
ever, I know that this is a contradiction and so, by NC, it is not justifiably believable
for me. This is Kyburg’s [1961, 1970] famous lottery paradox.
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2. One of ST, CC and NC has to go. But which one? It is widely agreed that the
least promising candidate is NC. After all, it is reasonable to think that NC is a basic
principle of justified believability.
In fact, there is independent reason to think that it NC is not at the fault in the
lottery paradox since the paradox can be generated without invoking NC. To see
this, consider the following plausible thesis:
No Moore Pardoxes (NMP). Propositions of the form ‘φ but I don’t know that φ ’ (hence-
forth also ‘Moorean propositions’) are not justifiably believable for one.
Now consider a lottery, l′, which is just like l except that there is no guarantee that
the lottery will have a winner. Instead, all I know is that there might be a winner,
and hence that I do not know that all tickets will lose. It is not hard to see that the
lottery paradox can be generated with ST, CC and NMP only. By ST and CC, it
is justifiably believable for me that all tickets will lose. Since I know that I do not
know that all tickets will lose, it is justifiably believable for me that I do not know
that all tickets will lose. By another application of CC, it is justifiably believable for
me that all tickets will lose but I do not know that all tickets will lose. By NMP this
is not justifiably believable for me. We thus have a version of the lottery paradox
that does not rely on NC.1
3. Denying CC is perhaps initially the most attractive option. After all, one might
think that even if we have to give up CC, it might be possible to rescue at least a
restricted version of CC. Thus consider:
CC’. If p is justifiably believable for one and q is justifiably believable for one, then their
conjunction, p and q, is justifiably believable for one, unless it is a contradiction.
Another noteworthy consequence of the Moore paradoxical version of the lottery
paradox is that this way of restricting CC won’t do the trick either. The reason
for this is that the Moore paradoxical version of the lottery paradox shows that no
contradiction is needed to generate the paradox. After all, the proposition that all
tickets will lose but I do not know that all tickets will lose is not contradictory.
Replacing CC by CC’ won’t do the trick.
Of course, one could add to the list of riders. Thus consider:
CC”. If p is justifiably believable for one and q is justifiably believable for one, then their
conjunction, p and q, is justifiably believable for one, unless it is either a contradic-
tion or a Moorean proposition.
1 In fairness to deniers of NC, it should be noted that this argument might turn out dialectically
ineffective against those who reject NC. After all, if you are willing to reject NC, you will likely not
be too attached to NMP either. At the same time, for the many who do not want to give up NC, it
does provide an additional reason for not so doing: they would have to give up a further plausible
principle governing justified believability. Thus, even if these considerations do not move foes of
NC, I take them to provide some reason to think that NC is not the culprit of the paradox. Of course,
if NC is not the culprit, it’ll have to be either CC or ST.
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Now, CC” smacks of ad hocness. What would be needed to remove the air of ad
hocness is some unifying and independently plausible account of why CC” should
feature these riders. I cannot help but suspect that the only plausible candidate ap-
peals to the notion of justified believability. The reason why CC” makes exceptions
for contradictions and Moorean propositions is that they are not justifiably believ-
able. But that, of course, won’t do at all since holding that the conjunction of two
justifiably believable propositions is justifiably believable unless it isn’t renders the
principle trivial. All we would have done is replace ad hocness by triviality.
4. Fortunately, the most common reason for rejecting CC is different. Here is the
rough idea: We are fallible cognitive agents in the sense that, for a wide range of
propositions, there will always be a small risk that, when we come to believe them,
we make a mistake. At the same time, we are capable of justified belief in the
sense that justified belief is attainable for a wide range of propositions, including a
subset of propositions in the aforementioned range. Given that this is so, justified
believability is compatible with a small risk of error. The aggregation of justifiably
believable propositions involves an aggregation of small risks of error. Small risks
of error accumulate to larger risks of error. Crucially, while justified believability
is compatible with a small risk of error, it is not compatible with too large a risk of
error. The problem with CC is that aggregation of justifiably believable propositions
may lead to risk of error that is simply too large. In that case, even though each
member of the aggregate is justifiably believable, the aggregate as a whole is not.
CC is bound to fail [e.g. Kyburg 1997, Foley 1979. An ancestor of the idea can be
found as early as Ramsey 1929].
These considerations would seem to provide a more promising diagnosis of the
lottery paradox. After all, for any fair lottery with n tickets and exactly one winner,
and any subset of m tickets, the risk that all its members won’t lose is m/n. When
n is sufficiently large and m sufficiently small, this risk will be very small, small
enough, in fact, to allow that the proposition that all members of the subset will lose
is justifiably believable for one. At the same time, when m is large enough, the risk
of error will be too large to allow the proposition that all members of the subset will
lose to be justifiably believable for one. If this is right, CC is bound to fail in the
lottery case.
This diagnosis predicts that one cannot justifiably believe of all tickets in a fair
lottery that they will lose. When the lottery is large enough, one cannot even jus-
tifiably believe of nearly all or even most tickets that they will lose. One would
run too great a risk of error in so doing. This looks like a welcome result. After
all, it appears independently plausible. In a lottery with one million tickets and one
winner, one cannot justifiably believe that all one million tickets will lose. One also
cannot justifiably believe that the first 999,567 or the first 500,000 tickets will lose
either. One is too likely to be in error here. These results add to the attractiveness
of the present proposal.
5. I do not want to deny that this diagnosis is attractive at first glance. However, I
will argue that, despite its initial appeal, in the final analysis it remains unsatisfac-
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tory. The reason for this is that the paradox can once again be generated in a way
that bypasses the relevant principle, in this case CC. Here’s the alternative principle:
Minimal Coherence (MCH). If one knows that the conclusion of an argument one knows
to be valid is not justifiably believable for one, then some premise of the argument is
not justifiably believable for one either.
Suppose you were to believe the premises of an argument you know to be valid,
whilst knowing that you cannot justifiably believe its conclusion. Belief in the
premises rationally commits you to the truth of the propositions you believe. Know-
ing the argument to be valid rationally commits you to the truth of its conclusion. If
you simultaneously know that you cannot justifiably believe its conclusion, you are
in the unfortunate situation of being rationally committed to the truth of a proposi-
tion that you know you cannot justifiably believe. Your doxastic state is incoherent
in a manner reminiscent of a Moorean paradox. MCH captures the plausible thought
that such incoherences must be avoided.
MCH is inconsistent with ST. There are several ways of arguing this. Here is
one. Note that, by NC, one class of propositions that are not justifiably believable
for one are propositions one knows to be contradictory. As a result, MCH serves to
motivate the following principle:
Minimal Consistency (MCN). If one knows that the conclusion of an argument one knows
to be valid is a contradiction, then some premise of the argument is not justifiably
believable for one.2
To see that MCN is inconsistent with ST, let S1 be an agent who knows that there
is a valid argument from the premise set {ticket 1 will lose l, . . . , ticket n will lose l,
l has n tickets, l has one winner} to the conclusion ⊥. By MCN, some member of
the premise set is not justifiably believable for S1. At the same time, each member
of the premise set is very likely to be true on S1’s evidence. By ST, each member of
the premise set is justifiably believable for S1.
While I take this argument to provide strong reason to believe that ST is false, it
does not serve to show that the above mentioned diagnosis in terms of accumulation
of small risks is bound to remain unsatisfactory. Fortunately, there is another way
of arguing that MCH is inconsistent with ST, which does the trick. Recall that, by
NMP, no proposition of the form ‘φ but I don’t know that φ ’ is justifiably believable
for one. Let S2 be an agent who knows:
P1. that there is a valid argument from the premise set {ticket i will lose l, I don’t know
that ticket i will lose l} to the conclusion ticket i will lose l but I don’t know that ticket
i will lose l, for each i ∈ l,
P2. that any such conclusion is Moore paradoxical and thus is not justifiably believable
for him,
P3. that he does not know that ticket i will lose, for each i ∈ l.
2 Notice that, besides receiving support by the plausible MCH and NC, MCN is independently
plausible. After all, it captures the epistemic force of reductio arguments [Kaplan 1981].
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Since S2 knows P1 and P2, by MCH, he cannot justifiably believe at least one of
the argument’s premises. That means that either ticket i will lose l or I don’t know
that ticket i will lose l is not justifiably believable for S2. Since, by P3, S2 knows
the latter premise to be true for each i ∈ l, it follows that ticket i will lose l is not
justifiably believable for S2, for each i ∈ l. At the same time, ticket i will lose l is
highly probably on his evidence and so, by ST, justifiably believable for S2.
Crucially, the fact that small risks of error accumulate to larger risks of error
does little to block the present argument. After all, we are aggregating justified
believability for only two propositions. And while the risk of error associated with
each proposition may be small enough to be compatible with justified believability
and yet too large to be so compatible when aggregated, it need not be. Given that
the probability of I don’t know that ticket i will lose l surpasses the threshold at
issue in ST, we can set up l such that the odds against winning are high enough that
the probability of ticket i will lose l but I don’t know that ticket i will lose l is still
above the threshold at issue in ST. It comes to light that, on ST, Moore paradoxical
propositions come out as justifiably believable. Since this cannot be the case, ST
must be false.
6. We ought, then, to look for a solution to the lottery paradox according to which
ST comes out false. Unfortunately, there is an immediate difficulty that this project
faces. As Douven and Williamson [2006] have recently argued, the prospects of
finding a satisfactory such solution are dim. After all, one might think that a satis-
factory solution will retain at least the following qualified version of ST:
ST’. If the probability of p on one’s evidence is very high, then p is justifiably believable
for one, unless one’s justification for believing p is defeated [Douven and Williamson
2006: 758].
Given that we want to retain at least ST’, our mission is to countenance a type of
defeater such that all and only propositions of the form ‘ticket ι will lose lottery λ ’
(henceforth also ‘lottery propositions’) are not justifiably believable for one. The
problem that Douven and Williamson have identified is that an important class of
proposals for such a defeater is bound to fail. More specifically, they have shown
that no structural property can make for a defeater of the kind sought after. Roughly,
a property of propositions is structural if it supervenes only on its truth-functional
and probabilistic properties or, in other words, if it can be defined in strictly logical
and mathematical terms only. The reason why structural properties don’t make for
the right kind of defeater is, in essence, that, for any proposition p with probability
< 1 and structural property, P, we can run a lottery on p, as it were, by making it
a member of a set, ∆, of equiprobable propositions which are jointly inconsistent.
Given that CC and NC continue to hold, we can still generate the paradox. If so,
the assumption that p has P does precious little to block the lottery paradox. Thus,
structural accounts of the defeat property at issue in ST’ are bound to fail.3
3 Douven and Williamson also argue that their result applies to the most prominent solutions to
the lottery paradox that venture to replace ST by ST’, including the ones in [Pollock 1995, Ryan
1996] and Douven’s own earlier proposal in [Douven 2002].
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7. In view of this, the obvious move at this stage is to try and work out a non-
structural account of the defeat property at issue in ST’. Douven and Williamson
explicitly acknowledge that their result does not foreclose this option. However,
they also emphasise that it is far from clear that this can be done without collapsing
the resulting sufficient condition on justified believability into one on which justified
believability requires probability 1 [Douven and Williamson 2006: 774-75]. I will
not attempt to meet this challenge.
Fortunately, however, there is another way of avoiding Douven and Williamson’s
result, which denies not only ST but also ST’. In what follows, I will explore the
prospects of one way of implementing just this kind of solution.
Recall that, according to ST’, high probability on one’s evidence is sufficient for
justified believability unless one has a defeater. In the interest of readability, in what
follows I will use ‘prima facie justified believability’ as a shorthand for ‘justified
believability unless one has a defeater’. This gives us the following alternative way
of stating ST’:
ST’. If the probability of p on one’s evidence is very high, then p is prima facie justifiably
believable for one.
ST’ makes a lot of sense for anyone working in what may be called a tradi-
tional epistemological framework. Roughly, the traditionalist framework takes true
belief to be a fundamental epistemic good and justified believability to be essen-
tially connected to true belief. Now, on this view, if the probability of a proposition,
p, on one’s evidence is very high, then it is very likely on one’s evidence that in
believing p, one will secure the fundamental epistemic good of true belief. Given
that justified believability is taken to be essentially connected to this fundamental
epistemic good, it makes perfect sense to grant prima facie justified believability to
a proposition the probability of which is high on one’s evidence. In this way, it is
only natural that champions of a traditional epistemological framework should be
attracted to ST’.
While the traditional framework is arguably still the most popular one in con-
temporary epistemology, there is an alternative view that has received an increasing
amount of support in recent years, which following Williamson [2000] we may call
the knowledge first framework. According to this framework, again roughly, the
relevant fundamental epistemic good is knowledge rather than true belief. Correl-
atively, justified believability is taken to be essentially connected not to true belief
but to knowledge.
For those adopting a knowledge first epistemology, it is far from clear that they
should accept ST’ in the first place. While it makes sense to grant prima facie justi-
fied believability to a proposition the probability of which is high on one’s evidence
if the fundamental epistemic good to which justified believability is essentially con-
nected is true belief, the same does not hold if the relevant fundamental epistemic
good is knowledge and not just true belief. After all, if so, from the fact that the
probability of a proposition, p, on one’s evidence is high, it simply does not fol-
low that it is very likely on one’s evidence that in believing p, one will secure the
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fundamental epistemic good to which justified believability is essentially connected
according to the knowledge firster. In fact, considerations concerning lottery propo-
sitions forcefully indicate that a proposition can be very likely on one’s evidence,
whilst this fundamental epistemic good is still out of reach entirely. As a result,
knowledge first epistemologists should have little inclination to sign up to ST’ in
the first place.
Recent years have witness a surge of knowledge first epistemological accounts
of justified belief. Knowledge firsters have argued that justified belief just is knowl-
edge [Sutton 2007, Williamson Forthcoming, Littlejohn 2013], possible knowledge
[Jenkins Ichikawa 2014] or the appearance of knowledge [Reynolds 2013]. It has
been argued that justified belief is normatively coincident with knowledge [Smith
2014] and that one has justification for believing a proposition just in case one has
justification for believing that one is in a position to know it [Smithies 2012]. We
also find knowledge first versions of accessibilist [Millar 2010], mentalist [Bird
2007] and virtue epistemological [Miracchi 2015, Kelp Forthcoming-a,b, Kelp and
Ghijsen Forthcoming] accounts of justified belief. Many (if not all) of these views
are good candidates for offering a solution to the lottery paradox on which we don’t
have justification for believing lottery propositions, on the face of it at least. In fact,
its champions often motivate their view in part by the fact it provides this kind of
solution to the lottery paradox. Moreover, for at least the vast majority of these
views, the reason why we don’t have justification for believing lottery propositions
is clearly not that a defeater is present. Rather, on these views, we are never in
the ballpark for justification to begin with. If so, there is reason to believe that,
on these views, lottery propositions turn out to not enjoy even prima facie justified
believability.
Of course, all of the above accounts are importantly different. To investigate
whether all solutions to the lottery paradox that have been proposed by knowledge
firsters survive closer scrutiny will go well beyond the scope of this paper. For that
reason, in what follows, I will focus on my own knowledge first version of virtue
epistemology. More specifically, I will first introduce the view and then argue that
it offers a viable solution to the lottery paradox, leaving comparisons with other
knowledge first accounts of justified belief for another occasion.4
8. Consider a framework for what I call ‘simple goal-directed practices’ (SGPs),
which feature two types of particular, moves and targets, and a designated relation.
For a practice to be goal-directed, it must have a success condition. In SGPs a
success is defined as a move that stands in the designated relation to the target. By
way of illustration, consider a very simple version of target archery, call it ARCH,
in which the target is a disc with a set surface area, moves are shots taken from a set
distance and the designated relation is the hit relation. A success in ARCH, then, is
a shot that hits the target.
With the basic framework in play, I offer the following accounts of (i) abilities
to attain success in a given SGP, (ii) exercises thereof and (iii) competent moves in
4 See [Kelp and Ghijsen Forthcoming, Kelp Forthcoming-b] for some such comparisons.
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a given SGP.
SGP Ability. One has an ability to attain success within a certain range, R, of SGPs, and
relative to a set of conditions of shape (SH) and situation (SI), just in case, one has a
grounded way of move production, W , such that using W in SH and SI disposes one
to attain success within R.
The core idea here is that abilities involve dispositions to attain success [Sosa 2010,
Greco 2010]. For instance, for an archer to have the ability to hit the target in
ARCH, he must have the disposition to hit the target in ARCH.
Abilities are relative to ways of move production. The reason for this is that an
agent may have more than one way of move production available not all of which
may constitute an ability to attain success. For instance, while an archer may shoot
with his right or with his left hand, only one way of shooting may qualify as an
ability to hit the target.
Moreover, the ways of move production at issue in abilities must be grounded.
Not every disposition to succeed constitutes an ability. Consider an archer who
shoots arrows straight up in the air. On a faraway planet in which the gravitational
forces are very different, this way of shooting may dispose him to hit the target.
However, that does not mean that the archer has the ability to hit the target, not even
on that planet. What makes the difference between a genuine ability and a mere
disposition to succeed? Taking a leaf from Millikan [2000: ch. 4], I want to say that
etiology matters. Here is Millikan:
In general, the conditions under which any ability will manifest itself are the
conditions under which it was historically designed as an ability. These are
conditions in which it was learned, or conditions in which it was naturally
selected for. They are conditions necessary to completing the mechanisms by
which past successes were reached by the systems or programs responsible for
the abilities.
[Millikan 2000: 61]
The reason why the archer’s way of shooting does not qualify as an ability is that
it does not satisfy the etiological constraint. The archer’s way of shooting arrows
up in the air did not lead him to successful moves in the conditions in which he ac-
quired this way of move production. That’s why it does not qualify as an ability. In
other words, the archer’s way of shooting is not grounded. The groundedness condi-
tion thus captures the etiological constraint on abilities, which makes the difference
between a genuine ability and a mere disposition to succeed.
Finally, abilities are relative to conditions of shape and situation [Sosa 2010].
For instance, an archer may have the ability to hit the target when shooting in virtue
of having a grounded way of shooting that disposes him to hit the target when
sufficiently concentrated, sober, not being shoved while releasing the arrow (= SH),
winds are normal, targets are not sabotaged (= SI) and so on. Compatibly with that,
his way of shooting may not dispose him to hit the target when too drunk, shooting
in a hurricane and so on.
With the account of SGP abilities in play, here is how I understand their exercise.
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SGP Exercise. One exercises an ability, A, to attain success within a certain range R of
SGPs and relative to SH and SI just in case one has A and produces a move via the
way of move production at issue in A.
Exercises of SGP abilities are uses of the ways of move production at issue in them.
An archer exercises his ability, A, to hit the target just in case he produces a shot via
the way of shooting at issue in A.
In my view, unsuitable SH prevent agents from using the relevant ways of move
production and hence from exercising their abilities. For instance, being too drunk,
distracted, nervous, etc. prevents an archer from using the way of shooting that in
more favourable SH qualifies as an ability to hit the target. In contrast, unsuitable
SI do not prevent agents from exercising their abilities. A shot may be blown off
target by a gust of wind (unsuitable SI) and yet the agent may have exercised his
ability to hit the target.
Finally, exercises of SGP abilities must be distinguished from competent SGP
moves. In order to produce a competent move in an SGP, one must not only exercise
an SGP ability, but the SGP must also be in the range of one’s ability. Consider an
SGP in which the target is line-shaped (call it ARCHX ) and an archer who does not
have the ability to hit the target in ARCHX . Of course, our archer may still produce
a shot via a way of shooting that constitutes an ability to hit targets in other SGPs,
such as ARCH. In that case, he will have exercised an SGP ability. However, that
does not make his shot competent. After all, the ability he is exercising is the wrong
ability for the SGP he is engaging in, i.e. ARCHX . A competent move, then, is a
move in an SGP that is within the range of the ability exercised. This gives us:
Competent SGP Moves. A move in a given SGP, S, is competent if and only if it is
produced by an exercise of an ability attain success within a certain range R of SGPs
and relative to SH and SI such that S ∈ R.
9. With this account of SGPs, abilities, their exercises and competent moves in play,
I suggest to view inquiry into specific whether questions as an SGP, or better: as a
set of SGPs (one for each question). The idea here is that the targets of inquiry
are correct answers. For instance, the target of an inquiry into whether p is the
proposition that p, if p is true and the proposition that not-p, if p is false. Moves
in inquiry are beliefs. For instance, believing p constitutes a move in an inquiry
into whether p, as does believing not-p. The designated relation in inquiry is the
knowledge relation. A success in inquiry, then, is a belief that qualifies as knowl-
edge (henceforth also a ‘knowledgeable belief’ for short).5 For instance, a belief
that p stands in the designated relation to the target of an inquiry into whether p if
and only if it qualifies as knowledge that p.
The corresponding accounts of abilities to know, their exercises and competent
moves in inquiry are then straightforward:
Ability to Know. One has an ability to know propositions within a certain range, R, and
relative to SH and SI, just in case, one has a grounded way of belief formation, W ,
5 See [Kelp 2014a,b,c] for arguments that knowledge is the goal of inquiry.
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such that using W in SH and SI disposes one to form knowledgeable beliefs about
propositions within R.
Exercises of Abilities to Know. One exercises an ability, A, to know propositions within
range R and relative to SH and SI just in case one has A and forms a belief via the
way of belief formation at issue in A.
Competent Belief. One’s belief that p is competent if and only if it is formed by an exercise
of an ability to know propositions within R and relative to SH and SI such that p ∈ R.
10. On my account of knowledge, knowledge is a basic form of epistemic success,
to wit, success in inquiry. One interesting fact about knowledge is that it features
a competence condition: one knows that p only if one competently believes that
p. The reason this is interesting is that successes in SGPs do not generally require
that the move be competent. Even a randomly fired shot (e.g. a shot taken whilst
blindfolded at an undetectably moving target) may still hit the target and thus be
successful. In contrast, a randomly formed belief (e.g. a belief based on the outcome
of a fair coin toss, supposing it were possible to form a belief in this way) will not
qualify as knowledge.
In addition, it is widely agreed that knowledge requires an epistemically suffi-
ciently hospitable environment. These considerations motivate the following com-
petence condition on knowledge:
Knowledge (K). One knows that p only if one competently believes that p in SI (alterna-
tively: one believes that p via an exercise, in SI, of an ability to know propositions
within R and relative to SH and SI such that p ∈ R).
Of course, K does not offer a reductive analysis of knowledge in terms of jus-
tified true belief. It is not intended to either. After all, K is meant to be part of a
knowledge first approach to epistemology, which explicitly drops the ambition of
giving a reductive analysis of this kind.6
Moreover, in true knowledge first-style, I venture to reverse the traditional di-
rection of analysis and offer an account of justified belief in terms of knowledge.
The core idea is that justified belief is competent belief in the sense at issue in
Competent Belief. In other words,
Justified Belief (JB). One justifiably believes that p just in case one competently believes
that p (alternatively: one believes that p via an exercise of an ability to know propo-
sitions within R and relative to SH and SI such that p ∈ R).
11. What about the lottery paradox then? In order to connect JB with the lottery
paradox, we first need a principle connecting JB with the notion of justified believ-
ability. Here’s my suggestion:
6 I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing of philosophical substance to be said about the
nature of knowledge. In fact, I am inclined to think that the nature of knowledge is given by the
thesis that knowledge is the goal of inquiry.
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Justified Believability (JBY). p is justifiably believable for one only if one is in a position
to believe p via an exercise an ability to know propositions within range R and relative
to SH and SI such that p ∈ R.
To see how JBY solves the lottery paradox, consider first arbitrary lottery proposi-
tion, say ‘ticket 3 won’t win the fair lottery I am about to hold’ (henceforth ‘pl’).
By JBY, pl is justifiably believable for one only if one is in a position to believe
that pl via an exercise of an ability to know propositions in range R and relative to
conditions SH and SI such that pl ∈ R. This in turn requires one to be in posses-
sion of a grounded way of belief formation, W , such that using W disposes one to
form a knowledgeable belief that pl in at least some SH and SI. Crucially, however,
when the only evidence bearing on pl one has at one’s disposal is the probabilistic
evidence concerning the low odds of winning, no grounded way of belief formation
in one’s possession disposes one to form a knowledgeable belief that pl , no matter
what conditions one may find oneself in. In consequence, pl is not in the range of
any of one’s abilities to know. If so, one is not in a position to believe pl via an
exercise an ability to know propositions within range R and relative to SH and SI
such that pl ∈ R. By JBY, pl is not justifiably believable for one. Since pl is arbi-
trary lottery proposition, the result generalises to all propositions of the form ‘ticket
i won’t win fair lottery l’. In consequence, when the probabilistic evidence is the
only evidence one has, by JBY, lottery propositions are not justifiably believable for
one.7
Finally, it may be worth stressing once more that the reason why we don’t have
justification for believing lottery propositions on this view is not that a defeater
present. Rather, we are never in the ballpark for justification to begin with. As a
result, there is reason to believe that, on the present view, lottery propositions are
not even prima facie justifiably believable.
12. Before closing, it may be worth noting a few more appealing features of JBY.
First, it validates NC. After all, no one even has an ability to know propositions
that they know to be contradictory. Hence, by JBY, known contradictions are not
justifiably believable. Similarly, JBY validates NMP as no one has an ability to
know Moorean propositions either.
As I argue elsewhere [Kelp Forthcoming-b] in more detail, JB is compatible
with a version of a closure principle for justified belief:
Closure-JB (CJB). If one competently deductively reasons from p1, . . . , pn to q; if one
thereupon comes to believe that q; and if one justifiably believes that p1, . . . , pn
throughout, then one’s belief that q is justified.
7 There may be cases in which one has other ways of forming beliefs about lottery propositions.
For instance, one may have been told by a reliable informant that a certain ticket will lose the
lottery because the lottery is rigged against it. Since, at least in certain conditions, believing lottery
propositions on the basis of the informant’s say-so disposes one to acquire knowledgeable beliefs
about lottery propositions, in this situation one is in a position to believe the lottery proposition via
an exercise of an ability to know. By JBY, the lottery proposition is justifiably believable for one. I
take this to be the right result.
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Notice that knowing that there is a valid argument from p1, . . . , pn to q constitutes
one way of being in a position to competently deductively reason from p1, . . . , pn to
q. If so and if CJB holds, then the following principle is also plausible:
Closure-JBY (CJBY). If p1, . . . , pn are justifiably believable for one and one knows that
there is a valid argument from p1, . . . pn to q, then q is justifiably believable also.
It is not hard to see that CJBY also serves to validate MCH and, in conjunction with
NC, MCN.
It thus comes to light that, apart from offering a promising solution to the lot-
tery paradox that rejects ST (and ST’), my knowledge first virtue epistemological
account of justified belief serves to validate NC and NMP, is compatible with CJB,
CJBY and CC and promises to validate MCH and MCN (modulo CJBY). Since, as
we have seen above, there is reason to believe that a solution to the lottery paradox
that abandons ST is desirable and since all the aforementioned principles are highly
plausible, I submit that this is good news for my account.
References
Bird, A. (2007). What is scientific progress? Noûs, 41:64–89.
Douven, I. (2002). A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability. British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53:391–410.
Douven, I. and Williamson, T. (2006). Generalising the lottery paradox. British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57:755–779.
Foley, R. (1979). Justified inconsistent beliefs. American Philosophical Quarterly,
16:247–57.
Greco, J. (2010). Achieving Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Jenkins Ichikawa, J. (2014). Justification is potential knowledge. Canadian Journal
of Philosophy, 44:184–206.
Kaplan, M. (1981). A Bayesian theory of rational acceptance. The Journal of
Philosophy, 78:305–30.
Kelp, C. (2014a). Two for the knowledge goal of inquiry. American Philosophical
Quarterly, 51:227-32.
Kelp, C. (2014b). No justification for lottery losers. Pacific Philosophical Quar-
terly, 95:205–17.
Kelp, C. (2014c). Knowledge, understanding, and virtue. In Fairweather, A., ed-
itor, Virtue Scientia. Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Springer,
Dordrecht.
12
Kelp, C. (Forthcoming-a). Knowledge first virtue epistemology. In Carter, A.,
Gordon, E. and Jarvis, B., editors, Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology
and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelp, C. (Forthcoming-b). Justified Belief: Knowledge First-Style. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research.
Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. (Forthcoming). Perceptual justification: factive reasons
and fallible virtues. In Mi, C., Slote, M. and Sosa, E., editors, Moral and Intel-
lectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy. London: Routlege.
Kyburg, H. (1961). Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Wesleyan Univer-
sity Press, Middletown/CT.
Kyburg, H. (1970). Conjunctivitis. In Swain, M., editor, Induction, Acceptance and
Rational Belief. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Kyburg, H. (1997). Probabilistic acceptance. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth
conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence, UAI’97, pages 326–33.
Littlejohn, C. (2013). The Russellian retreat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soci-
ety, 113:293–320.
Millar, A. (2010). Perceptual knowledge and recognitional abilities. In Pritchard,
D., Millar, A., and Haddock, A., editors, The Nature and Value of Knowledge.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Millikan, R. (2000). On Clear and Confused Ideas. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Miracchi, L. (2015). Competence to know. Philosophical Studies, 172:29–56.
Pollock, J. (1995). Cognitive Carpentry. MIT Press, Cambridge/MA.
Ramsey, F. (1990/1929). F.P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Reynolds, S. (2013). Justification as the appearance of knowledge. Philosophical
Studies, 163:367–83.
Ryan, S. (1996). The epistemic virtues of consistency. Synthese, 109:121–141.
Smith, M. (2014). Knowledge, justification and normative coincidence. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 89:273–95.
Smithies, D. (2012). The normative role of knowledge. Noûs, 46:265–288.
Sosa, E. (2010). How competence matters in epistemology. Philosophical Perspec-
tives, 24:465–475.
13
Sutton, J. (2007). Without Justification. MIT Press, Cambridge/MA.
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Williamson, T. (Forthcoming). Justifications, excuses, and sceptical scenarios. In
Dutant, J. and Dorsch, F., editors, The New Evil Demon. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
14
